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Chapter 15. Why
Frankfurt's “Second Order Desires”
Do Not Allow for a Free Will
Free will being an illusion, and not
representative of how things really
are, our belief in it is very
problematic to our actions on both
the personal and global level. It
leads to blame, accusations,
conflict, competition, self-blame,
arrogance, envy, and creates many
problems. The two strongest
refutations to that are that,
firstly, we have an unconscious
where all of our memories are
stored. That unconscious is
obviously not in our control. We’re
not even conscious of it. It’s also
the part of our brain that contains
the processes by which we make our
decisions. When we make a decision,
we’re not thinking to ourselves,
“Why exactly did I decide that?”
“What calculations did I use?” This
all takes place at the level of the
unconscious. If both the data and
the processing for making decisions
occur in the unconscious, obviously
that makes free will impossible. Our
decisions are being made at a level
of our mind that we’re not in
control of, and that we’re not even
aware of in real time. The second
reason free will is impossible is
that everything has a cause. If we
make a decision, there is a cause
for that decision. And there’s a
cause for that cause, and a cause
for that cause, and if you follow
that chain of cause and effect back
through its history, it stretches
back to before we were born.
Let’s begin refuting Frankfurt’s
“Second Order Desires” claim against
free will. Harry Frankfurt is a
philosopher who claims that while
other animals have “first order”
desires, human beings have both
first and second order desires. An
example of a first order desire
might be that we want something to
eat because we’re on a diet, and
want to lose some weight. A second
order desire, in this case, would be
that we want something to eat, but
would rather that we didn’t want
something to eat.” It’s a desire
about a desire. Frankfurt is saying
that because we have second order
desires, that prospect would somehow
give us a free will. There is no
logic in that, as we’ll see later,
but that’s his assertion. Let’s
first defend our animal friends.
Throughout history, we’ve made
claims that animals don’t feel, and
we’ve treated animals horribly
because of this absurd notion.
Whether it is farm animals or lab
animals, we refuse to acknowledge,
and admit to ourselves, that they
absolutely do feel pain. There is no
evidence for the assertion that
animals don’t have second order
desires. For example, a dog named
Cachidulo lives an apartment, and
wants to pee. He wants to pee, but
there is no one around to take him
out for a walk. Cachidulo knows that
in the past when he’s gone to the
bathroom on a carpet or other floor,
he has been punished. We can all
relate to the idea that a dog would
have that understanding. Naturally,
Cachidulo would very probably want
to not want to go to the bathroom.
Cachidulo is probably saying to
himself, “Gee I wish I didn’t have
to go to the bathroom, because I
would rather not get punished
afterwards. Dogs clearly have second
order desires.
Let’s say we have a second order
desire. We want to not want to eat,
or we want to not want to smoke, or
not want to whatever. But, how would
that grant us a free will? A want is
a reason, and whether it’s a direct
want or a want about a want, it’s
causal. If it’s a want about a want
– if I would want to not want to eat
– there will be a reason for wanting
that. When you have a reason, you
have a cause. So, the simple
refutation to these Frankfurt-style
second order desire arguments for
free will is “No, a second order
desire in no way allows the decision
to escape this law of causality that
governs everything. Second order
desires are not a valid
demonstration of free will because
of causality. Naturally, the
causality of the unconscious refutes
this claim equally well. That second
order desire – that wanting to not
want something – is taking place at
the level of the unconscious. It is
drawing from information stored in
the unconscious. There have to be
reasons why we would want, or not
want, to do something. There is also
our reasoning process. If all of our
data – our memories and other stored
information – is in our unconscious,
then the processing of our decisions
must also be made at the level of
the unconscious. We can understand
how we have no control over our
unconscious. The unconscious is
certainly a part of us – no one is
disputing that – but it’s a part
that we have absolutely no real-time
control over.
It’s as if your hand was saying “I
made this decision to put myself
here,” whereas the reality is that
your mind made the decision. Our
conscious mind simply becomes aware
of decisions that the unconscious
makes, and claims credit for them.
There are actually many experiments
in neuroscience and psychology, like
experiments with hypnosis, that
demonstrate this misattribution. For
example, subjects are hypnotized and
given a post-hypnotic suggestion to
do something. They come out of the
hypnosis, and perform the
post-hypnotic suggestion. They are
then asked why they did what they
did. They then make up a reason, or,
more sincerely, plead ignorance.
They express no recognition, or
knowledge, that the reason they did
what they did was because of the
post-hypnotic suggestion. Every
decision is made at the level of the
unconscious, because that is where
at least some of the data is. The
decision making process must also be
unconscious to be able to access
that data. Naturally, since we can’t
control the unconscious, the
decisions it makes cannot be thought
of as having been freely made by our
conscious mind. Frankfurt had a few
other claims that are also mistaken
in terms of how they would allow for
a free will. He claims that free
will is having the will that we
want. In other words, if we can want
what we want to want, to him that’s
free will. But that’s not free will.
That’s just luck. If we have a will
to stop smoking, for example, and
we’re actually able to succeed with
this, we’re fortunate. Such fortune
in no way demonstrates that our want
was freely willed. When we consider
the question of human will in terms
of wants, or desires, we understand
why free will is impossible. We’re
not in control of our desires.
Whether we desire a certain kind of
food, or experience, or music, or
clothing, or whatever, these are
preferences that are the complete
result of genetics and past
experience. We can’t, at the moment
we’re making a decision, just choose
our desires. They have been chosen
for us by this causal process of
nature and nurture.
Frankfurt makes another kind of
curious assertion. He says that some
people are what he describes as
“wontons.” He says that these people
don’t have impulse control. They
can’t control their impulses, so
they naturally don’t have a free
will. He’s, of course, right about
impulses. We all have impulses, and
to the extent that we can’t control
them, that naturally demonstrates
that the impulses, and not a free
will, are controlling us. But, he
claims that those of us who can
control our impulses have a free
will. Why does that not make sense?
Let’s say we control an impulse. Why
did we do that? There must have been
a reason. Once we have a reason for
doing something, we have a cause for
doing something. Naturally, that
cause has a cause, and that cause
has a cause, and you end up with a
causal regression leading to before
our planet was created. Any time
there’s a question regarding why we
do anything, or an assertion that we
have a free will, the refutation is
always the same. For example, one
plus one is always going to equal
two. That will be the answer whether
the ones are in Roman numerals or
Chinese characters, or whatever.
It’s always the same answer. With
any claim to a free will, there are
two basic answers. The first is
causality. If a decision, to control
our impulse has a reason, that
reason is a cause. Causality is the
reason why the decision is not
freely willed. The other reason is
the unconscious. We generally tend
to think somewhat linguistically.
Some of us think more in terms of
imagery, but our thinking tends to
involve the memory of concepts like
“table,” and “chair,” which are
stored in our memory. In order to
make a decision about whatever, we
have to consider it. If that
information is not consciously
available to us, it must be stored
in the unconscious. It has to be,
because for it to be consciously
available, we would have to be aware
at the moment of any decision every
word and every memory that we’ve
ever had. That is clearly
impossible. We have to study to take
tests. If we had a free will, we
could just commit something to
memory, and at test time just write
it without hesitation, because we
could freely draw whatever we willed
from our memory bank. Obviously,
very few of us can do that to any
substantial degree, and even we who
can, at a certain point, fail at
accessing the memories. It is always
our unconscious that allows us to
access any of that information.
The unconscious not only stores the
data upon which we’re making
decisions, impulse control, or
whatever, but also our actual
decision making processes. Why are
we deciding one way rather than
another? Is it a moral decision? Is
it a hedonic decision? Is it a
rational decision? These are all
considerations that are taking place
at the unconscious level. We
obviously don’t consciously go
through the entire process of why
we’re making a decision when we
think. That’s often what a gut
feeling is about. Someone asks us
something, and we wait for the
answer to come to us. Let’s briefly
discuss the notion of second order
desires from the standpoint of
desires. Desires are conditioned to
a great extent. The foods we prefer
are different from the foods people
from other countries prefer. This
starts very early. We’re conditioned
to like something, or not. Sometimes
even at a very early age, you find
that mothers will try to get their
children to eat spinach and some
other foods. It doesn’t always work.
Sometimes our desires are genetic.
Our strongest desire – the one
actually responsible for all of our
decisions, including moral
decisions– is the hedonic desire, or
the desire to seek pleasure and
avoid pain. We’re hard-wired for
that. All organisms are hard-wired
for that. Let’s consider a second
order desire to stop eating. Why
would we want to do that? Perhaps we
want to be healthier, or happier, or
whatever. Any time we desire to not
want something, there is a hedonic
reason for that desire. That reason
relates to our well-being. We
predict that if we don’t want to
want something, or don’t want to not
want something, that will make our
life, or the lives of those around
us, better. The hedonic imperative
of always seeking pleasure and
avoiding pain is a great way to
understand why we don’t have a free
will. If all of our decisions are
based on that imperative, obviously
we can’t have a free will.
We generally talk about how our
wills are completely determined by
causality, and how the past moment
completely determines our will. But,
we should remember that everything
is completely causal. If you go
outside and see cars and people
moving, and birds flying, take
notice that everything is happening
in a completely causal way. We are
actually taking part in a kind of
movie, and reality, or our world, is
the movie. It’s even more amazing
than that, because generally with a
movie, the actors get to interpret
their roles somewhat. Actors have
some say in how they interpret their
character, and play their role. But
in this movie called reality – our
universe – we don’t even get to
interpret our roles. Our every
reaction to everything is
predetermined. What I’m also saying
is that it’s not just human behavior
that is causal. It’s not just animal
behavior that is causal. The Sun,
and the rain, and the entirety of
nature, are all causal. It’s all
predetermined. I do not describe
reality as “predestined,” because
that relates to the religious
concept that some people are
pre-destined to a better or worse
place in the afterlife. But,
essentially, everything that is
happening at this moment in time is
predetermined by cause and effect.
We’re spectators, rather than the
writers. We experience, rather than
decide. From a religious
perspective, asserting that we have
a free will is like asserting that
we are mini-gods who “create”
decisions. However, if we believe in
a God that is all-powerful, all
powerful means that God’s decisions
rule. Our actions are basically
expressing God’s will. We’re
instruments of God. That way of
understanding our human will makes
more sense to many of us. It feels
much better than describing us as
robots or puppets, or computers. A
computer is programmed to do certain
tasks, and it has no free choice but
to do those tasks. We can accurately
describe ourselves as robots or
puppets or computers, but that
self-definition is impersonal. I
believe in God, because I define God
as everything, which makes God
synonymous with our universe. By
retaining our belief in God, and
understanding our lack of free will
within that context, we personify
both ourselves and our wider
reality. God is generally defined as
omniscient, or all-knowing. God is
also often described as omnipresent,
or everywhere. If God is everywhere,
we are a part of God. Everything is
a part of God. There isn’t anything
that exists that isn’t a part of
God. Logically, if God created
everything, s/he had to have created
everything from her/himself. From
that standpoint, we’re the hands of
God. We’re the instruments of God,
and the vehicles for God’s will.
We’re certainly a part of God, but
we’re not the decision making part.
There is a part of reality that you
can define as either the causal past
or God, although it’s more precisely
defined as the causal past. Question
then arise. Does God have a free
will? Can God break this law of
causality? I’m not sure s/he can. I
would hope s/he can’t, because I
like to believe in a good and loving
God. That understanding obviously
doesn’t make sense because there are
so many not-so-good and unloving
things in the world. But, to the
extent that I ascribe a free will to
God, then I would have to hold
her/him responsible. If I understand
that God is compelled by causality
in every act, I can hold God as
innocent as we are. When we fall for
the notion that we have a free will,
we hold ourselves responsible. We
indict ourselves, and convict
ourselves, and punish each other and
ourselves. When we understand that
we don’t have a free will, and we
hold ourselves as innocent, we’re
much more understanding. Some of us
are afraid that if we abandon the
illusion of free will, everyone will
just do whatever they want, because
they will say, “You can’t blame me.
I’m programmed – blame the
universe.” The reason we would not
let that happen is because we’re
programmed, to be hedonic creatures.
We’re always going to seek pleasure
and avoid pain, both as individuals
and as a society. This means that if
someone is going around doing
something that is not good for them,
or us, we’re going to take steps to
not allow that. I trust you now
understand why the Frankfurt second
order desires argument for free will
just doesn’t make sense.
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