| |
Dear
Dr...
I am
writing to ask you to consider a
short proof I have developed that
demonstrates that human free will,
if it exists, must be necessarily
amoral, and describes how it’s
alternative, a determined will, must
be necessarily both moral and
non-accountable. I would appreciate
any comment or critique you can
offer me regarding this proof.
If
human beings are truly in possession
of a free will that is capable of
making choices that are not
compelled by genetic and/or
environmental causes, and this free
will therefore makes such choices
for no reason other than to simply
exercise its agency, such a free
will must be necessarily amoral, and
is, therefore, not worth having.
We can
test the validity of this
proposition by examining it within
the context of a specific moral
example; the choice of whether or
not to steal. A person’s free will
that has chosen to not steal has, by
definition, made this choice
completely independent of any cause
or reason other than to simply
exercise its power to act. However,
if the person’s free will has chosen
without having been compelled by
moral considerations, the free will
has made its choice amorally. The
freely willed choice to not steal
cannot be considered a moral choice
because it did not rely on moral
precepts as its basis or reason.
Indeed, a free will that does not
base any of its moral choices on
moral precepts is necessarily amoral
One
might here object that the person’s
free will could have considered some
moral precepts relevant to stealing,
and then freely and independently
decided to not steal. However, this
prospect is incoherent, or logically
impossible; a will that chooses to
not steal because it considers
stealing wrong has based its choice
on a moral precept, and this moral
precept becomes the cause of the
choice. Once a will makes a choice
for a moral reason, indeed for any
reason, the choice is immediately
and completely rendered
deterministic, and we can no longer
deem the will that made the choice a
free will.
Expressed in greater detail, once we
have established any reason for a
choice, in this case the moral
aversion to stealing, we have
demonstrated that the choice was
made by a determined rather than a
free will, and that the choice is
therefore subject to a reverse
causal chain that stretches back to
a cause completely outside of the
control of that will. In our
example, the person’s choice to not
steal was caused by a moral aversion
to stealing. To explain this moral
aversion, we can surmise one of many
possible reverse causal chains, such
as the following: The person’s moral
aversion to stealing was caused by
having learned from his parents the
immorality of stealing. Since this
learning was not freely willed or
chosen by the person, his choice to
not steal was therefore also not
freely chosen. The cause of the
person’s not stealing is the
person’s parents’ morality.
The
simple inescapable truth is that a
free will cannot, by definition,
make moral decisions. Such a will is
categorically amoral, and therefore
not worth having.
Conversely, if human beings are
truly in possession of a determined
will whose choices are compelled by
genetic and/or environmental causes,
and this will makes either moral or
immoral choices, such a will must be
necessarily moral in the sense that
its choices are made according to,
and reflect, either moral or immoral
reasons. Such a determined will is,
however, non-accountable, being
neither credit- nor blameworthy for
its choices, as explained generally
by standard deterministic theory and
its principle of cause and effect,
and specifically by the above
example demonstrating the
deterministic nature of a will
having chosen to not steal.
The
only other case left to examine as
we consider a will’s morality and
accountability is the possibility
that humans possess an indetermined
will, or a will that makes its
choices according to an
indeterministic process. An
indetermined will must necessarily
make its choices indeterministically,
or randomly, and, as such, cannot be
deemed to make those choices based
on moral precepts. Thus an
indetermined will cannot make moral
decisions, and is, like a free will,
categorically amoral.
A free
will and an indetermined will must
both be amoral. Only a determined
will can be moral, however because
it is determined, this will must be
non-accountable. These conclusions
are certainly not entirely
satisfying. But consider some other
conclusions we face that are equally
less than entirely satisfying. We
live in a universe that is either
eternal or temporal, and either
infinite or finite, but these
questions seem to transcend our
ability to answer through either
reason or science. We are alive as
human beings for a few seconds,
minutes, hours, days, weeks, months,
years or decades, and then we die
and are subject to either
non-existence or to an existence
about which we know absolutely
nothing.
More
and more evidence is mounting to
establish the firm conclusion that
our human wills are determined. We
have, however, fortunately been
determined to be lucky. Although we
are far from perfect in this
pursuit, we seem hard-wired to seek
pleasure and avoid pain. In other
words, we are hard-wired to seek
happiness. And although we have been
determined to make many mistakes, if
we are to accept Aristotle’s
conclusion, we seem similarly
hard-wired to choose to do only that
which we consider to be good, it
being only our ignorance of the true
good that causes us to be anything
other than good. John Locke tied
these two concepts of happiness and
goodness together in a way that
explains their relationship with his
definition of goodness as that which
creates happiness.
So, to
the extent we choose to view our
human wills as moral and determined
rather than amoral and free or
indeterministic, we can take
optimistic solace in the
understanding that our human will
has been determined by the causal
past to act according to goodness,
to seek happiness, and to,
consequently, seek the knowledge to
better ascertain that goodness that
will create the greatest happiness
for the greatest number.
Thank
you.
Sincerely,
George
Ortega
White
Plains, New York
george_ortega390@esc.edu
cc:
John Bargh
Antoine
Bechara
Susan
Blackmore
R. J. R. Blair
Paul Bloom
Paul Breer
Joseph
Campbell
Phillip Cary
E. J. Coffman
Herbert
Fingarette
John
Fischer
Owen Flanagan
Melissa
Ferguson
Gilberto Gomes
Patrick Grim
John-Dylan Haynes
Steven
Hitlin
John Horgan
Robert Kane
Irving Kirsch
Hans-Ludwig
Kroeber
Neil Levy
Michael
McKenna
Stephen Morse
Eddy Nahmias
Dana Nelkin
Shirley Ogletree
John Ostrowick
Derk Pereboom
John
Perry
Steven Pinker
Susan Pockett,
Howard Rachlin
V.S.
Ramachandran
Richard Rakos
Adina
Roskies
Richard Ryan
Markus
Schlosser
Tim
Schroeder
Laura
E. Schulz
Saul Smilansky
Helen
Steward
Galen
Strawson
Pedro Tabensky
Laurence
Tancredi
Robert
J.Valenza
Manuel
Vargas
Kathleen Vohs
Bruce Waller
Ted A.
Warfield
Daniel Wegner
Andrei Zavaliy
|
